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In discussion of the birth of the Japanese automobile industry, most researchers and 
journalists obviously talk about the Toyota Motor Corporation and the Toyoda-Platt 
Agreement.    It has been widely asserted that the one million yen that was received as a result 
of the Agreement provided Kiichiro Toyoda with the means to begin doing research on the 
automobile.  But the historical evidence does not support this legendary story, and in many 
ways  contradicts  it.  This  paper  aims  to set the historical record straight. 
 
1/33  
1. Is the legendary story correct? 
  Toyota Motor Corporation is now one of the most famous companies in Japan( see Fig.1 on 
the relationship of the companies appearing in this paper).  One can find whole shelves of 
bookstores in Japan with books and magazines on Toyota.   Many of them have recounted 
the legendary story on the birth of Toyota as follows:   
 
(1) Sakichi Toyoda (1867-1930), a great inventor of textile machinery in Japan, 
developed a non-stop shuttle change automatic loom, the Type G Toyoda automatic 
loom. 
(2) Sakichi Toyoda sold the license for producing the Type G Toyoda automatic loom to 
Platt Brothers & Co. in England.     
(3) Platt Brothers intentionally did not produce Type G looms because the company just 
wanted to keep the Type G out of the market.  In addition, Platt Brothers wanted to 
re-negotiate the license contract in order to reduce the license fee. 
(4) On his deathbed, Sakichi Toyoda, furious about Platt Brothers’ behavior, gave the 
license fee from Platt Brothers to his son, Kiichiro Toyoda (1894-1952), and directed 
him to establish a car manufacturing business.  Kiichiro Toyoda, therefore, 
established the automobile manufacturing business in Japan because of the dying wish 
of his father, Sakichi . 
 
This legendary story, now widely accepted, tells us that a dutiful son followed his ingenious 
father’s advice, out of which emerged one of the greatest companies in the world.  A few 
scholars, however, have been skeptical; one has characterized it as the “setting for a story that 
was a bit too much like the stuff of minstrel ballads” with its focus on this “dying wish of 
Sakichi”.
艐    In fact, the historical evidence does not support this legendary story, and in many 
ways contradicts it.  Setting the historical record straight is important for understanding the 
conditions that supported the emergence in the 1930s of a company that would lead Japan’s 
remarkable growth in the post-World War II era. 
   It has been widely asserted that the one million (1,000,000) yen that was received as a 
result of the Toyoda-Platt Agreement provided Kiichiro with the means to begin doing 
research on the automobile.  In The Biography of Sakichi Toyoda,
艑 a famous Japanese 
historian claimed: 
 
The 100,000 pounds that were received on the basis of the Toyoda-Platt Agreement 
eventually provided Kiichiro with the motive to make the Toyota automobile after 
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assessed as the selling price of the patent rights the sum of 100,000 pounds 
stipulated in the Toyoda-Platt Agreement.    The Toyoda side countered by showing 
the text of the contract and insisting that the money was to be paid in installments 
of 8,000 pounds every half-year (16,000 pounds a year) and thus levying a tax on 
the entire amount was unfair, but the Taxation Office refused to change its position 
that tax must be paid on the entire 100,000 pounds.  Then the Toyoda side 
appealed to the Incomes Inquiry Committee, which decided that “the tax levy is in 
error,” and the higher Incomes Inquiry Committee (which is part of the Nagoya 
Taxation Supervisory Board) came down with a similar decision. . . . Finally in 
1933 it instituted administrative litigation.    In subsequent years its general director 
was changed four times, and after the war jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Supreme Court; all together, the case was heard more than twenty times, and in the 
end it was referred to mediation.  Since the whole of the 100,000-pound fee 
(royalty) for use of the patent right had already been paid in full, the issue was 
resolved by the payment of about 500,000 yen in all, including 160,000 yen for 
income tax and the rest for prefectural, municipal, and other taxes.
艒 
Though this was how it was finally resolved, Sakichi was so angry at the 
unreasonable manner of acting of the Taxation Office that he told Kiichiro, “Seeing 
that these 100,000 pounds are jinxed, you might as well use the money to study 
automobiles; after all, it’s the same as if we found it on the street.  It’s a million 
yen that I figured we’d have to deposit in the bank anyway, so I guess you might as 
well use it to do groundwork for making automobiles.”  Kiichiro, who had 
returned from his trip to the United States and Europe in March 1930, was 
extremely happy to be told this, and he immediately set up an automobile program 
in the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works factory that nobody knew about.
艓   
 
    The amount of money Toyoda received from Platt Brothers in 1930, however, was not one 
million yen but just 250,000 yen – an insufficient sum to carry out automobile-related 
research.  It appears, moreover, that this sum was distributed among Toyoda employees to 
lift their morale.  The financial condition of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works had been poor 
in 1930.  The company had cut wages and dismissed 21 workers in the summer of 1930, 
resulting in a labor dispute. At the memorial service in February 1931, on the hundredth day 
following Sakichi’s death, 250,000 yen was distributed among about 6,000 employees in the 
Toyoda group as a special reward for past services.  Of this sum, 100,000 yen was divided 
among the senior personnel who had worked directly with Sakichi in the course of his 




3/33 The legendary story of the origins of Toyota is, therefore, unreliable.  Indeed, to fully 
comprehend the conditions that made it possible for Kiichiro Toyoda to found Toyota Motor 
Company, and the role of the Toyoda-Platt Agreement, it is necessary to recognize the role of 
Kiichiro’s own career in the 1920s, beginning with work experience at the factory of Platt 
Brothers in 1922, as well as the subsequent invention of the “Type G automatic loom”, the 




2. Work experience at the Platt Brothers factory, and the 
birth of the “Type G Automatic Loom” 
 
i) Work Experience at the Factory of Platt Brothers 
Kiichiro Toyoda once boasted: “I feel confident that I take a back seat to nobody when it 
comes to looms.”
艕  Most people usually regard Kiichiro as merely the founder of Toyota 
Motor Corporation.    His statement, however, shows how much he prided himself on his 
abilities as a textile machine engineer, which was his real métier.    In March 1938 Kiichiro 
received the Imperial Commemorative Award from the Imperial Academy of Inventions in 
recognition of his shuttle-change automatic loom (Patent No. 65156), the basic patent of the 
Type G automatic loom.    This award was the highest honor a Japanese inventor could 
receive.    His father, Sakichi Toyoda, had also received the same award from the same 
Academy in September 1926 for his invention of the automatic loom.    Sakichi was the 
second person to receive the Imperial Commemorative Award; Kiichiro was the fourth.       
    Initially, at the beginning of Kiichiro’s career, Sakichi had wanted his son to concentrate on 
the spinning business.  So, after his graduation from the Department of Mechanical 
Engineering of the Faculty of Engineering of Tokyo Imperial University in 1920, Kiichiro 
entered his father’s Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. (Toyoda Boshoku), which had 
been established in 1918.  Only two of 48 graduates of the Department of Mechanical 
Engineering found employment in the textile industry, and one of them was Kiichiro.
  艖   
In April 1921, Kiichiro Toyoda began work at the Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Co.  In July of that year, he left Japan on a trip, first, to the United States, and, then, to 
England.    The original plan was for Kiichiro to “stay in England for one or two years”,
艗 but 
he stayed there only about two weeks.  During that time he went to Platt Brothers to 
understand the structure of textile machines.  If he had stayed “in England for one or two 
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order to understand the operations of the spinning business.   
But after visiting Platt Brothers of Oldham for about two weeks, Kiichiro was called back 
to Japan.    Why did Kiichiro suddenly leave for Japan without staying “in England for one or 
two years”?  One of the Toyoda group companies, Kikui Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 
(Kikui Boshoku), had a plan to set up a new plant, with operations scheduled to begin in June 
1918.  But World War I activities affected the production schedule of the American 
company, Whitin Machine Works, from which they had ordered the spinning machines, and 
so Kikui Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.’s construction plans were seriously delayed.  It 
would be July 1922 by the time the spinning machines arrived from the United States and 
were properly installed so that the company could begin operating in the new location.
艘  
Whitin Machine Works sent some of its technicians to help install the machines and teach 
Japanese operators how to tend them.  Thus it was that Kiichiro was able to learn from the 
American technicians not only how to handle the machines but also how to maintain control 
over and run an entire spinning mill.
艐艏    Therefore Kiichiro had no reason to stay in England.   
Kiichiro later wrote: “Fortunately, Westerners came and taught me [about the secrets of how 
to operate a spinning mill] very thoroughly for one whole year.”
艐艐  
During his short stay at Platt Brothers in Oldham, Kiichiro wrote about its operations in 
detail in his diary.  Furthermore, Kiichiro’s diary contains a hand-written drawing that 
extends over seven pages of a design for a cop-change automatic loom.  There are several 
other similar drawings as well, all of them of cop-change style looms.  His father, Sakichi, 
had devoted all his energies to developing shuttle-change looms, but in Oldham Kiichiro was 
studying automatic looms that were different from those preferred by his father.  Later 
Kiichiro wrote: 
 
When we [Kiichiro and a few others] were still doing research on automatic looms I 
thought that [the cop-change method] was better, but my father, Sakichi Toyoda, 
was adamant in insisting that the shuttle-change method was better.  He said he, 







ii) The Invention of the shuttle-change automatic loom 
Sakichi Toyoda was a great inventor, and nobody had ever matched his contribution to the 
development of the loom in Japan.  Yet there was one thing Sakichi deeply regretted.  It 
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Right from the beginning, the company had encountered problems, as its president, Fusazo 
Taniguchi, pointed out in the general meeting of shareholders held in April 1907: 
 
Mr. Toyoda has added essential improvements to many different previous 
inventions, so that today the Toyoda loom is so advanced that I would not hesitate 
to claim that it is nearly as perfect as it can be in structure.    Still, while it definitely 
has advanced, the equipment needed to produce this loom in its entirety is still 
lacking, a fact that is very regrettable.
艐艒  
 
Production of this loom did not proceed smoothly.  The company had invited Charles A. 
Francis, an American instructor at Tokyo Higher Technical School (the present-day Tokyo 
Institute of Technology), to provide tools involved in the design of the loom that would ensure 
uniform standards and to achieve technical improvement and efficiency in the manufacture of 
loom.  But Francis was unable “easily to correct the inexperience, oversights, and mistakes 
of the workers.”
艐艓    The company strove for mass production of products by using parts that 
were interchangeable, but it failed in this attempt.  In Japan before the 1910s the techniques 
for producing castings and steel were not yet developed.    The use of inferior materials made 
it difficult to produce precision, interchangeable parts. 
Sakichi funneled all his efforts into working on the automatic shuttle changer, the key to an 
automatic loom that would be suitable for Japanese conditions.  But Toyoda Loom Co. did 
not have enough spare funds available to funnel money into leading-edge inventions, and the 
very survival of the company stood in jeopardy.    While Sakichi continued his mighty efforts 
to complete the automatic loom, one of the patented devices that seemed useless was Patent 
No. 17028, an “automatic shuttle changer” (patent applied for on 10 June 1909, registered in 
September 1909).  In Sakichi’s long career as an inventor, this shuttle changer was a 
masterpiece that must have been among his proudest inventions.    This device more than any 
other made it possible to produce a loom that both in name and in deed could be called an 
“automatic shuttle-changing” loom. Sakichi’s automatic shuttle changer had a two-stage 
motion.  A smooth shuttle change was impossible if there was even a slight delay between 
the two motions.    But it was extremely difficult to manufacture the device that precisely.
艐艔   
Yet when the research and development team headed by Rizo Suzuki, Risaburo Ohshima, 
and then Kiichiro aimed at developing an automatic loom, it was Sakichi’s automatic shuttle 
changer that was their starting point.  Sakichi’s ideal automatic loom was one that would 
“sense” when a warp or weft yarn broke and would stop immediately, and if the shuttle was 
running out of yarn the machine would have, built into it, a device that would replace that 
shuttle with a new one.  It was in order to develop this ideal machine that Sakichi had 
resolved to entrust research and development to Kiichiro and the others, while he supplied the 
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his head off.”
艐艕 
    When the research team had thirty looms working in early 1920s, they decided they 
would have two hundred looms made and test-run them, but a situation they had not expected 
stopped them in their tracks. Their own company, Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co., 
was not equipped to manufacture looms.    It was a spinning and weaving company whose 
principal purpose was to do research on loom performance rather than on loom construction.   
Kiichiro and his team had been expecting to have the two hundred looms made instead by 
Toyoda Loom Co.    In the past there had been friction between Sakichi and Toyoda Loom 
Co., but Kiichiro went ahead and put in a request for two hundred looms.    But Toyoda Loom 
Co. refused to manufacture the looms, and furthermore the company stressed that it owned the 
patent rights because Sakichi had transferred the rights to the company several years earlier: 
the patent in question was Sakichi’s “automatic shuttle changer,” Patent No. 17028.    The 
patent had been registered on 18 September 1909, so its fifteen-year term would soon be 
running out.    If the patent period were extended, the automatic shuttle changer that had 
become operable thanks to the efforts of Kiichiro and his research team might never be put to 
practical commercial use. 
Still, in the process of taking steps to enable Sakichi’s automatic shuttle changer to 
function properly, Kiichiro and his team had already ironed out the problems in Sakichi’s 
patent.    Kiichiro and his team had made changes to the structure of the patented shuttle 
changer to prevent the occurrence of the slight delay between its two motions.    Kiichiro 
writes about this in a very matter-of-fact way. 
 
In this situation we did not panic.    The reason was, in the course of our experimental 
manufacture of the thirty looms, various ideas came up and we tried different things, 
as a result of which we realized that the single-stage method of changing the shuttle 




This newly devised patent was “a thing that was structurally absolutely simple, and it worked 
flawlessly.”
艐艗    It is not surprising that the Forty-Year History of Toyoda Automatic Loom 
Works would describe it in the following exultant terms. 
 
The “shuttle-change automatic loom” registered as Patent No. 65156 was an 
epoch-making device that changed the shuttle smoothly even when running at high 
speed, without slowing down and without damaging the shuttle.    When some years 
later technicians from Platt Brothers saw it in action they were awe-stricken and 
called it “the magic loom.”    When the automatic shuttle changer and other 
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found; this marked the birth of the perfect automatic loom.
艐艘 
 
The name of the person to whom the patent rights for the “shuttle-change automatic loom,” 
Patent No. 65156 (applied for on 25 November 1924, registered 10 August 1925) were 
conceded was none other than Kiichiro Toyoda.    It was on this patent that Kiichiro received 
his commendation from the Imperial Academy of Inventions. 
There is an epoch-making significance in the fact that “the perfect automatic loom” was 
born in the mid-1920s.    At the beginning of the twentieth century a brief attempt was made 
to introduce the Northrop cop-change automatic loom into Japan.    Because of, among other 
things, problems with the quality of yarn, use of the automatic loom did not spread.    But the 
recession in 1920 led to moves toward industrial rationalization, and this was soon followed 
by heightened interest in machine automation.    This was true in the spinning and weaving 
industry as well.    The Type G automatic loom was born in the midst of a move to enhance 




iii) The Establishment of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works: 
Manufacturing of the “Type G Automatic Loom” 
 
The prototype of the Type G automatic loom was completed during the summer and autumn 
of 1924.  Probably in September, but at the latest by the middle of October, trial operations 
began and preparations were made to submit a patent application.  Then the patent 
application was officially submitted on 25 November. 
In 1924 Kiichiro went on a business trip to Shanghai with his family.
艑艐  Sakichi 
wanted Kiichiro to transfer all 1,008 ordinary looms that were in operation in Toyoda 
Boshoku’s main plant to the company’s Shanghai plant, and replace them with the newly 
perfected Type G automatic looms.    Staking the company’s fortunes on this automatic loom, 
Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.’s planned to run the main plant as a weaving 
factory that would simultaneously function as a testing laboratory.   After the financial panic 
that followed World War I, and the campaign for industrial rationalization, momentum was 
growing in the spinning industry to adopt automatic looms.  If Toyoda’s experiment 
succeeded, they would be able to take woven-cloth manufacturers into the plant, and show 
them the Type G automatic looms working nonstop.  The plan, in short, was to show the 
world the practicality of the Type G automatic loom. 
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Spinning and Weaving Co.’s plant would have to be adjusted once they were installed in the 
Shanghai plant.  If it had been a matter of one or two looms there would have been no 
problem, but when over one thousand looms would need adjusting, every expert hand was 
needed.  There would be some damage incurred during transport.  There would be 
differences in temperature and humidity between Shanghai and Nagoya.  There would be 
differences in the quality of the cotton yarn.  All these factors would require a great deal of 
tinkering with the looms before they would be running smoothly again.    In order to carry out 
this task, Kiichiro went over to Shanghai.    Kiichiro was resigned to a long stay in Shanghai, 
and therefore he began to study Chinese.
艑艑 
But Kiichiro was barely settled in Shanghai before he received instructions to return to 
Japan with his family.    After a stay in Shanghai of almost three months, Kiichiro returned to 
Nagoya in December 1924 to be involved with the establishment of Toyoda Automatic Loom 
Works. 
Originally, as we have seen, Sakichi and Risaburo’s plan was to transfer the 1,008 
ordinary looms located in the Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.’s main plant to the 
Shanghai plant, and install the new Type G automatic looms in their place in the main plant, 
where experimentation would occur.  To carry out this plan, Toyoda Cotton Spinning and 
Weaving Co. would need a thousand or so new Type G automatic looms.    The company did 
not, however, have equipment for building machines, so it placed an order for 1,008 loom 
frames with Toyoda Loom Co. (the same company with which there had been troubles over 
the ownership of Sakichi’s patented automatic shuttle-change device). The latter turned down 
the order for loom frames.  As a result, Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. was 
forced to change its original plans.  It called off the plan to transfer looms to the plant in 
Shanghai.  Sakichi went to an acquaintance of his, one Sakuzo Nozue, and leased an iron 
works Nozue owned in Hioki-cho in Nagoya.    Obtaining the cooperation of Chotaro Kubota 
(a man who had once been in charge of loom casting under Sakichi and had started up his own 
casting factory), Sakichi decided to have foundry equipment made so Toyoda Cotton 
Spinning and Weaving Co. could manufacture automatic looms itself. 
The impact of the sudden change in circumstances went beyond the now aborted plan to 
transfer looms to Shanghai.    Since a factory for manufacturing looms would now be needed, 
a decision was made to purchase land near the Kariya experimental factory and build on it a 
factory for the full production of automatic looms.    This shift in strategy, so important from a 
managerial perspective, meant that there no longer was any reason for Kiichiro to be in 
Shanghai.    On the contrary, now Kiichiro was needed for the construction of the new factory,     
he had to make a hasty return to Japan. 
Why did the Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. try to place an order for 1,008 
loom frames?  As the experimental manufacturing of a prototype Type G loom progressed, 
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Type G looms.    The original plan was to sell the automatic shuttle changer as a separate unit 
that the purchaser would attach to an ordinary loom.  The new plan was to incorporate the 
automatic shuttle changer in a completely new loom.    Kiichiro explains why: 
 
We attached the automatic loom part to 200 new ordinary looms and tried them out 
in the Kariya plant.    It was a disaster.    In hindsight, it sounds a stupid thing to do.   
At the time, though, we went to a lot of trouble to adjust the automatic looms, and 
when unexpected breakdowns occurred and things somehow just wouldn’t work well, 
we felt as if the automatic looms were possessed by the Devil.  Before we had 
installed the 200 looms we had tested 30 of them fully and were sure we had ironed 
out all problems, but then when we went ahead and installed 200, and the above 
problems kept occurring; we sometimes were ready to give up altogether.  From 
this bitter experience we became convinced that it was absolutely impossible to 
attach this automatic part to earlier ordinary looms, especially the older ones.
艑艒 
 
This unsuccessful experiment in attaching automatic shuttle changers that require precise 
action to ordinary looms that were not made with very high precision made Kiichiro for the 
first time conscious of an important concept in manufacturing: “allowance,” or “permissible 
margin of error”.  The problem he had to solve now was how to get a loom with the 
automatic shuttle changer attached to it to operate smoothly.  The realistic solution was to 
manufacture an entire new loom into which the automatic shuttle changer would be 
incorporated, and then sell this new loom as a unit.  Once everyone involved agreed to this 
course of action, the decision was made to entrust everything, from the designing of the 
equipment for manufacturing the entire loom to the building of the factory to hold the 
equipment, to Kiichiro.  In the painstaking written documents that Kiichiro has left us, we 
see him striving to follow a detailed plan with the aim of beginning trial runs of the Type G 
automatic loom in the Kariya experimental factory by 1 September 1925. 
Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. decided that it would build an additional 320 
looms so that the Kariya experimental factory would have a total of 520.    It would also send 
spinning yarn from its main plant in Nagoya to the experimental factory.    It decided it would 
install Platt Brothers spinning machines with 20,000 spindles to go with the Type G automatic 
looms, so that the factory would be run as an integrated spinning and weaving plant.  The 
outcome of operations in this experimental factory would have a major impact not only on the 
fate of the Type G automatic loom but also on the management of the entire Toyoda Cotton 
Spinning and Weaving Co. enterprise. 
On the 25th of September 1925, Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. held a special 
general meeting of shareholders.  At the meeting it was decided to increase its authorized 
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  艑艓  By the 2nd
 
of November 1925, thirty-five yen was paid up for each of the new shares.
艑艔  The  company 
obtained 2,100,000 yen in order to finance the 20,000-spindle-capacity spinning machines for 
the Kariya experimental factory. 
By the end of March 1926, Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. had installed a 
total of 520 Type G automatic looms and 20,000-spindle-capacity spinning machines in the 
Kariya experimental factory, and trial operations as a spinning and weaving company were 
begun in earnest.  Thanks in part to its new spinning machines, “yarn of far better quality 
than even our main plant’s yarn was being spun, and the looms were running at top capacity 
after having been improved down to the smallest parts, so the result of the trials was 
absolutely ideal.”
艑艕 
Because the trial results were so good, it was decided to go ahead and build the factory to 
manufacture these automatic looms.  The site would be on land that had been acquired to 
build accommodation for workers employed by the experimental factory.  On 17 November 
1926, a general meeting was held in the offices of Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Co.’s main plant to celebrate the founding of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, and the Works 
was registered as a company the next day.    Risaburo Toyoda was appointed the president of 
the company, and Kiichiro became the managing director.    Kiichiro was only 32 at the time.   
Young as he was, he was handed responsibility for bringing the factory on line. 
The challenge facing Toyoda Automatic Loom Works was to make and sell the Type G 
automatic loom, the first automatic loom with a nonstop shuttle changer.  Toyoda  Automatic 
Loom Works was positioned to take advantage of a big business opportunity, because of the 
rise in demand for automatic looms expected with the abolition of night labor, due in July 
1929.  Cotton industry companies were afraid that the abolition of night labor would mean 
fewer working hours and a drop in production efficiency.  As a result, the question 
uppermost in their minds was whether the introduction of automatic looms into their plants 
would lead to a drop in production costs, even if it meant that they had to incur considerable 
initial investment costs.  If the company was going to grasp this opportunity, however, the 
Type G automatic loom had to be economical and reliable.     
The three largest cotton spinning companies, Toyo Spinning Co., Dai-Nippon Cotton 
Spinning Co., and Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning Co. (Kanebo), had accumulated substantial 
internal reserves, partly as a result of the restrictions imposed on plant expansion during 
World War I.  According to the president of Kanebo, Sanji Muto, abundant funds were 
available: “Among the spinning companies, Kanebo, Toyo, Dai-Nippon, and Godo [Osaka 
Godo Cotton Spinning Co.] alone had nearly 200,000,000 yen secretly salted away in 
banks.”
艑艖   In the light of circumstances such as these, it is clear that the cost of initial 
investment was not a big problem for the large spinning companies that also had weaving 
factories within their organizations. 
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looms, once manufactured, function properly when installed in the plants?  Would the 
quality of the cloth woven by these automatic looms be inferior to that woven by ordinary 
looms?    As the executive responsible for both manufacturing and sales, Kiichiro had to clear 
away as quickly as possible all these deep-set doubts and anxieties harbored by the potential 
clientele.  
When people are worried and skeptical about the performance of a new machine, the 
easiest way to dispel their fears and doubts is to let them see it working with their own eyes.  
When the company began advertising the automatic loom, it invited customers to come and 
have a look for themselves.    Not only were they “immediately swamped with inquiries,” but 
also “every day large numbers of visitors” came to the factory itself.
艑艗  After  they  inspected 
the factory where the looms were being built, the visitors were led to the other factory where 
the 520 looms were operating at high efficiency.    The sight of the machines in action is said 
to have made a deep impression on the visitors.  The fact that so many people came to visit 
the factories attested to the strong interest there was in automatic looms; it also showed the 
extent of their anxiety regarding whether the machines worked smoothly or not. 
In the five months between the time sales of the new looms began in November 1926 and 
the end of March 1927, orders came in steadily for over 4,000 automatic looms.
艑艘  
Apparently hoping to accelerate the pace of sales even more and at the same time clear away 
all doubts about the Type G automatic loom once and for all, Kiichiro decided to take the bold 
step of opening the Toyoda Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.’s Kariya factory to select 
members of the public in one grand gesture.  On 6
 February 1927, a workshop for textile 
engineers was held.  The attendees were invited to visit the factory, and they could also ask 
Kiichiro questions about the equipment or the machinery.  Sakichi was also supposed to be 
there to give a talk on how the Toyoda automatic loom was invented, but it seems he did not 
do so on that day.
艒艏  Still, the workshop was a huge success, both for Kiichiro and for 
Toyoda Automatic Loom Works.       
 
iv) Negotiations for Transferring Patent Rights 
Although orders for automatic looms were coming in steadily, Kiichiro seems to have become 
increasingly concerned about the future.  He was elated by the success of the Type G 
automatic loom.  But his company had competitors. One was Enshu Loom, which had 
succeeded in developing the cop-change method with its smaller margin of error, and they 
claimed the machine was working.    If they succeeded in mass-producing it, their loom would 
be a formidable rival for the Type G.  Although Toyoda Automatic Loom Works scored an 
overwhelming victory over Enshu Loom through its early sales tactics, Enshu Loom later 
fought back, exhibiting its loom in exhibitions and shows in 1928, winning a few prizes, and 
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tactics employed at Toyoda’s Kariya factories, it, too, opened its automatic loom factory so 
that visitors could see the looms in action.    In 1929 Toyoda Automatic Loom Works shipped 
4,004 looms to customers while Enshu Loom shipped 2,603. 
Another company that was continuing to develop a shuttle-change automatic loom was 
Toyoda Loom Co.  The trade journal, Boshoku-kai, mentions that “completion of a 
shuttle-change automatic loom by Toyoda Loom Co. is near,” and it goes on to say that “a 
shuttle-change attachment being researched by Toyoda Loom Co. was finally completed and 
used experimentally at Hattori Spinning, Izumi Spinning, and other companies.  The results 
were so good, Toyoda Loom Co. has decided to sell it in the general market.    A contract for 
approximately 100 machines is reported to have been concluded with a certain factory on the 
outskirts of nearby Hamamatsu City.”  And towards the end of 1929, under the headline 
“Invention of New Automatic Loom: Huge Spur to Weaving World?,” Nagoya Newspaper 
reported that Toyoda Loom Co. “has succeeded in producing a special automatic loom, and 
because the trial weaving was extremely successful, the company presently is producing 
considerable numbers in carefully kept secrecy.” Thus we see that, although Toyoda 
Automatic Loom Works was one step ahead of the other companies, Kiichiro was still living 
in a fiercely competitive situation in which, no matter what he produced, similar products 
would soon appear on the market.     
In such circumstances, Platt Brothers began to negotiate with Toyoda Automatic Loom 
Works for a transfer of the patent rights to the Type G loom.    As the production of automatic 
looms grew more widespread in Japan and the manufacture of spinning machines began to 
flourish, Platt Brothers also began to make overtures regarding the establishment of a merged 
company in Japan.    According to the company history of Toyoda Loom Co., talk of a merger 
emanated from Platt Brothers as early as 1920.    Again in November 1928 Platt is reported to 
have suggested a “joint management plan” to Toyoda Automatic Loom Works.  None of 
these negotiations bore any fruit.    But even afterwards Platt Brothers continued to sound out, 
with Mitsui Bussan acting as their intermediary, the possibility of a merger with Toyoda 
Loom Co. and Toyoda Automatic Loom Works.  In October 1929 the local Nagoya 
Newspaper opined that “it is safe to consider a merger [between the two Toyoda companies] 
only a matter of time now”, with Platt Brothers joining them.
艒艐  But in the end neither a 
merger between Toyoda Loom Co. and Toyoda Automatic Loom Works nor a tie-up between 
Platt and these other two companies occured. 
Platt Brothers’ continued negotiations with Toyoda Loom Co. and Toyoda Automatic 
Loom Works had a huge impact on the sale of the Type G looms.    Apparently hearing good 
reports about members of the public being allowed to visit the Toyoda Boshoku Kariya 
factory, in April 1929 Mr. Chadderton of Platt Brothers personally visited Kariya to see the 
factory for himself.
艒艑  Two months later the Nagoya Mainichi Newspaper reported that, on 
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of the London Branch of Mitsui Bussan (this is the same Mr. Dorman who had arranged 
Kiichiro’s hotel stays in England when he visited Platt Brothers in 1922), and that they had 
met with Kiichiro.  The article conjectured that patent right transfers were discussed at that 
meeting.   
We can also get some idea of the course of negotiations between Platt Brothers and 
Toyoda Automatic Loom Works from archival documents of the former.  Chadderton 
reported the results of his visit to Japan at a meeting of that company’s board of directors held 
on 21 August 1929.  He explained that Toyoda Automatic Loom Works was proposing that 
Platt Brothers manufacture its automatic looms after payment of a fee for using its patents.  
The board of directors responded positively to the proposal and resolved to make up their 
minds after seeing the results of a trial run of the two automatic looms that Toyoda had sent 
them.    But at the meeting of the board of directors held a week later, on the 28th of August, 
instead of deciding about whether to manufacture the Type G automatic loom or not, the 
discussion already centered on the question of the regions in which the company would have 
sales rights.    Platt Brothers had clearly formed a high opinion of the Type G automatic loom.   
In the end, on 11 September 1929 the company formally approved a contract with Toyoda 
Automatic Loom Works covering a transfer of patent rights. 
The spinning industry, which had generated such huge profits during World War I that 
Sakichi had urged Kiichiro to enter it, now was in the throes of a world-wide recession.     
In England, the state of the industry was so serious that, as negotiations proceeded with Platt 
Brothers in the summer of 1929, Kiichiro had come to have doubts about the future of 
manufacturing automatic looms.  When negotiations drew near to a settlement, it was 
decided that Kiichiro would depart for the United States and England on 12 September 1929 
in order to negotiate transfers of patent rights for Type G automatic looms.  But the 
negotiations with the leading US loom manufacturers, Draper Corporation and Crompton & 
Knowles Corporation, ended in failure.       
  
 
3. The Toyoda-Platt Agreement 
i)    Concluding an Agreement, and Its Contents 
The Toyoda-Platt Agreement was signed on the 21st of December 1929.    The contents of the 
Agreement has already been the subject of many publications and it is widely known.  Here 




14/33 Toyoda Automatic Loom Works gave Platt Brothers the exclusive right to 
manufacture and sell the Toyoda automatic loom in all countries except Japan, China, 
and the United States, in consideration for which it would receive a patent right 
transfer fee of 100,000 pounds sterling.  Later, Platt Brothers claimed damages 
regarding loom manufacture know-how, and the fee was reduced by 16,500 pounds.  
The final version of the contract was exchanged in September 1934.
艒艒 
 
This description is almost a hundred percent accurate (only the explanation of the sale of Type 
G automatic looms to Toyo Podar Mills, Ltd. in India is omitted).  Also, Yoshinobu Sato’s 
The Sources of the Toyota Business contains a careful description of the clash with Japan’s 
taxation office in regard to the timing of the tax imposed on the fee received from Platt 
Brothers, and the fact that a solution took some time.
艒艓  
Who were the two parties to the Agreement?  One of the parties was Platt Brothers, 
naturally.  But the other party was not Toyoda Automatic Loom Works.  It was an 
individual--Kiichiro Toyoda.    The reason the contract was made in Kiichiro’s name was that 
he was the patentee for the “shuttle-change automatic loom” and other devices incorporated 
into the Type G automatic loom. 
It is claimed in many writings that the Toyoda-Platt Agreement was motivated by Platt 
Brothers’ desire to purchase the patent rights in order to quash competition.  This view is 
expressed in Limitless Creation: 
 
Though Platt Brothers bought the patent rights, it in fact did not make more than just 
a few of these automatic looms.    This is what is known as “buying a patent to quash 
competition.”  Figuring that, if England and other countries started using the 
smoothly performing automatic loom, England’s spinning and weaving industries 
would not be able to survive, Platt Brothers, because of its position, merely gained 




Did Platt Brothers have the intention of quashing competition from Toyoda by purchasing the 
patent  rights?  And  did  Kiichiro, the other party to the contract, think that the agreement was 
a ploy on the part of Platt Brothers to quash competition?    Let us look at the structure of the 
payments for transfer of the patent rights.  At the time of the signing of the contract, Platt 
Brothers would pay Kiichiro £25,000.    During the next three years, Platt Brothers would pay 
Kiichiro £25,000 every year, for a grand total of £100,000.    If, however, the royalty of £4 for 
every loom did not reach the figure of £25,000 per year (that is, if Platt Brothers could not 
manufacture 6,250 looms a year), Platt Brothers would be obligated to pay Kiichiro a sum of 
£4,500 every half year for six successive half years, to be followed by payments of £4,000 
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£100,000.  This is what was stipulated about the £100,000 that, it is widely believed, was 
obtained from the Toyoda-Platt Agreement.
艒艕  
Just from these contract terms it is difficult to judge whether or not Platt Brothers had the 
intention of purchasing the patent rights in order to quash competition from Toyoda 
Automatic Loom Works, or whether or not Platt Brothers had some other motivation for 
letting the patent rights lie buried in a desk somewhere.  In Platt Brothers’ 19 March 1930 
meeting of the board of directors, a decision was made to publish an advertisement in an 
Indian trade magazine for the purpose of stimulating sales of the automatic looms that would 
be produced under the Toyoda-Platt Agreement.    It is, therefore, unlikely that Platt Brothers 
was intending right from the start not to use the patent rights.  It is more likely that Platt 
Brothers really intended to produce and sell automatic looms on the basis of the Toyoda-Platt 
Agreement, but despite the company’s efforts sales did not go very well.    To find out if this 
is true or not, we have to look at how things proceeded after the Toyoda-Platt Agreement was 
concluded.   
 
 
ii) Appraisal of the Automatic Loom 
In accordance with the Toyoda-Platt Agreement, Toyoda Automatic Loom Works sent a 
technician, named Shusaku Suzuki, to Platt Brothers.    Apparently Suzuki was an outstanding 
technician, because during his stay with Platt Brothers the company submitted an application 
for a patent (dated 21 February 1931) in which his name is given as joint inventor.  On 13 
May 1931, the Platt Brothers board of directors voted to present Suzuki with a gift to 
recognize his work during the fourteen months he had spent with the company, prior to his 
return to Japan.  It was highly unusual for Platt Brothers to vote in a board meeting to 
present such gifts to individuals; they had done it only once before, on the occasion of the 
retirement of Sanji Muto, president of Kanegafuchi Spinning and Weaving Co. (a good 
customer  of  Platt  Brothers).    
Even before Shusaku Suzuki left Japan, interest in the Toyoda Type G automatic loom 
was high, thanks to a report in The Textile Mercury weekly newspaper. 
 
The “Platt-Toyoda” is the name given to the new automated loom being made 
by Messrs. Platt Bros., of Oldham.    It is a Japanese loom designed and intended to 
run at 240 picks per minute.    Shuttle changing, when the pirns run empty, and also 
the weft breaks, is absolutely automatic. 
The loom at present running at Messrs. Platt Bros.’ Werneth Works, is working 
beautifully at 215 picks per minute. ... It is also expected that many existing 
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further that the “Platt-Toyoda” shall cover as wide a range of cloths as possible.
艒艖 
 
This article makes it easy to understand why interest in the Platt-Toyoda automatic loom was 
high.  Most probably the people at Platt Brothers greeted Shusaku Suzuki with the 
expectation that they would be able to seize a marvelous business opportunity with this loom.   
Even Kiichiro would have been very pleased at the high praise heaped upon his loom in the 
specialist English weekly newspaper (so different from its reception in the United States).     
The Lancashire Cotton Corporation (LCC), the largest group of cotton mills in England, was 
considering the adoption of automatic looms.  To determine whether to adopt the automatic 
loom, and if so which one, LCC decided to carry out performance tests from April 1931.  
Each manufacturer was to set up forty of its looms.    At Platt Brothers, the production of the 
looms for this test was entrusted to Shusaku Suzuki.    According to a report Suzuki sent back 
to Japan dated 14 March 1931, they had already assembled 37 looms and had three to go.    Of 
the 37 assembled, 35 had already been delivered to LCC, and Suzuki had finished adjustments 
on 25 of them.  It would seem that preparations were proceeding smoothly.  His report 
contains, however, a note of anxiety about the upcoming tests. 
 
The announcement that the examination of the performance of the Platt-Toyoda 
loom ... will take place from 7 April means that it will be too soon after the 
machines are put into action for the first time; because the wire healds are new, the 
large number of weft breaks will be higher than the number of weft breaks with the 
present Northrop looms.  I am trying to negotiate a delay in the tests because it 
puts us at a comparative disadvantage.
艒艗 
 
In the lead-up to the performance tests to begin on April 7th, Suzuki had no time to think 
about anything except adjusting the looms.  On the 1st of April he wrote to Japan: 
“Preparations finished; am convinced we can compete rather successfully if about 192 picks a 
minute  achieved.”   
Finally the day of the tests arrived.  Those who have written about the event often cite 
the report from the Japanese Consul  in  Liverpool.   
 
Lancashire Cotton Corporation, the largest cotton industry company in England with 
8,000,000 spindles and 20,000 looms, began testing the performance of all types of 
automatic looms from the end of 1930 with a view to improving the machinery the 
Corporation is using.  The loom for which Toyoda Automatic Loom Works has 
already transferred manufacturing and sales rights to Platt Bros. & Co., Ltd., located 
in Oldham, England--the so-called Platt-Toyoda loom--is also being included in 
 




After presenting this background information on the performance tests, the Consul concludes 
as follows: 
 
In short, if one looks at the test results as they stand at present, it is a contest among 
four looms: Northrop, Vickers-Stafford, Whittakers, and Platt-Toyoda.  The three 
first-mentioned looms are a step ahead of the Toyoda loom in performance, because 
of the perfection of the machines and the skill of the operators.    But it is said that, if 
the Toyoda loom makes a slight improvement in its present performance, it will far 
outstrip the other three looms.
艓艏 
 
Rather than conveying accurate information, the content of this report has more of the 
character of a chameleon.  When the Consul penned this report at the beginning of May, he 
passed on the news that the Platt-Toyoda loom was less efficient than the Northrop and other 
two looms, but then he immediately added the statement that with a “slight improvement…it 
will far outstrip the other three looms”.    But he indicates that this is all hearsay, prefacing his 
own words with “it is said that.”  Interested parties who would receive a report like this 
would no doubt, because of their expectations, be inclined to hone in on the “it will far 
outstrip the other three looms” part.  And in fact many people thought that the Platt-Toyoda 
automatic loom’s results on the performance tests were good.     
As the Consul’s report said at the start, however, the actual results of the test would not 
be made public till several months later.    The results of the automatic loom performance tests 
were published in the March 1932 issue of the Journal of the Textile Institute.
艓艐  T h e  t e s t  
results of the Platt-Toyoda loom were almost pathetic.    As stated in the final report: 
 
These were built by Messrs. Platt Bros. & Co. Ltd., of Oldham, and were the first 
40 Toyoda looms in England.  In consequence of this there have been many 
troubles due directly to the loom being a new production, and whilst a report can 
only be made on the results obtained, it must be borne in mind that Messrs. Platt 
Bros. are taking every advantage of their experiences at Higher Walton and many of 
the faults discovered will not occur again. 
This type of loom has a very heavy slay and in conjunction with the 
comparatively high speed of 187 picks per minute a great deal of vibration is created 
with a detrimental effect on the yarn.  The framing and crankshaft are not strong 
enough to hold the heavy moving parts.    So great was the vibration that the looms ... 
pulled loose the bolts and had to be refixed. 
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are rather too many set screws and bolts ... and the loom gives the impression of 
having had an attachment built into it instead of being a fully automatic weaving 
machine.    The loom turns the scale at 18 cwts., the framing being light but the slay 
heavy. 
There are also features which do not conform to American automatic loom 
practice; for example, the use of a heavy wooden cloth roller.... Chromium plating is 
extensively employed and has been a success for many small parts, and a failure for 
others.    Time will prove its usefulness. 
The loom is not well designed for the weaver as it is too deep for a short girl to 
reach across and too low.  The warp stop is of a type which makes a broken end 
comparatively difficult to find, as time tests have shown.  Again, the loom is very 
heavy to handle and the usual fast and loose pulley arrangement is not satisfactory 
for automatic weaving, as it puts too much physical strain on a weaver. 
There has been an excessive breakage of loom parts, caused partially by the 
newness of the loom, but also accounted for by the extremely fierce action of putting 
a 15-in. shuttle into a fast running slay and ejecting the spent shuttle in one motion.  
The loom uses the side lever-picking arrangement which is very sharp in action and 
this is reflected in broken picking sticks and worn pick points.
艓艑 
 
In the discussion of the Northrop loom, its performance is praised highly, in stark contrast 
with the appraisal given the Platt-Toyoda loom. 
How did the operating experiments carried out between 7 April and 31 July go?  The 
quality of the cloth produced by each of the looms was, according to the report, roughly the 
same.    The report recognizes that problems arose because of the newness of the Platt-Toyoda 
looms, but it also observes that “there are certain defects which need alteration” (p. 42). 
Given this report, obviously no hope remained that Platt Brothers would be producing the 
Toyoda Type G automatic looms and selling them to LCC.  What is more, even though the 
report assessed the Northrop loom highly as an automatic loom, it considered the Lancashire 
non-automatic power loom (i.e., the “ordinary loom”) to be more advantageous, cost-wise, 
when Lancashire labor practices were taken into consideration.  As a result, LCC decided 
against introducing any automatic looms.  Hence there was no possibility whatsoever that 
Platt Brothers would receive the large order from the Corporation for which it had been 
hoping.  Even acquiring a sub-licence with another automatic loom was now out of the 
question.  And now that the LCC appraisal of the Platt-Toyoda loom had been made public 
in a specialist magazine, it requires no stretch of the imagination to realize that prospects of 




iii) Searching for an Explanation 
Lancashire Cotton Corporation’s assessment of the Platt-Toyoda automatic loom--that 
“there are certain defects which need alteration”--has been accepted at face value by 
present-day researchers outside Japan.  In many textbooks and articles, assessments of the 
Platt-Toyoda loom make reference to the words contained in LCC’s final report.  It is not 
only historians who accept that this view of the deficiencies of the Platt-Toyoda loom.    Even 
interested contemporaries on the English side, including Sir Walter Preston, who took over as 
president of Platt Brothers in 1930, were persuaded that the LCC report told the whole story.       
But a nagging question arises at this point.    If, as the final LCC report says, the Type G 
automatic loom’s vibrations were so violent that the yarn snapped frequently and parts were 
being broken, why is it that Platt Brothers failed to discover these defects when they were 
testing the looms in their own factory?    Why is it that the Type G automatic loom was being 
used in weaving factories in Japan as well, but there are no records of any such complaints 
being lodged against it, and in fact large numbers of the automatic looms were being bought?   
To give a comprehensive answer to these questions would be quite difficult, but it is possible 
to indicate a few plausible answers. 
First of all, there could have been a problem with the yarn used for weaving.  Furuichi 
recalled that the Type G automatic loom achieved 250 picks a minute for a few moments 
when the loom was demonstrated in the United States, but he added that “the yarn we had 
brought with us from Japan was the best of Toyoda Boshoku’s yarns, and on top of that their 
preparatory processes and research on starch and so on had been thorough.”
艓艒  I n  o t h e r  
words, the quality of the spinning yarn used in Lancashire Cotton Corporation’s tests was 
inferior to the type of yarn the Toyoda Type G automatic loom was assuming.
艓艓  Either  that, 
or it is possible that there was insufficient time to adjust the looms to the quality of the yarn.   
Yet, when the technicians from Platt Brothers were making a decision about the transfer of 
patent rights while observing with their own eyes the operations of the two Type G looms that 
had been sent from Japan, would they not have tested not only the yarn brought from Japan 
but also yarn used in the Lancashire district?    Would they not have entered into negotiations 
for transfer of the patent rights precisely because, after witnessing such test results, they 
figured that the Type G loom could bear up under actual usage?  If that is the case, then we 
cannot look for the cause of the problem in the inferiority of the yarn used in the Lancashire 
Cotton Corporation experiments.  Of course, it is still possible that it was a combination of 
poor yarn and insufficient time to adjust the looms that was responsible for the inability of the 
Platt-Toyoda looms to run at top performance. 
Still, even if the problem of yarn quality was a factor that cannot be discounted, why is it 
that the Type G automatic loom produced so much vibration and caused so much breakage of 
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there may have been a major problem with the method of producing the automatic loom frame 
and parts and the method of assembling them at Platt Brothers.  The reason for such a 
conjecture can be found in the list of things that Shusaku Suzuki felt had to be improved in 
regard to production of the looms (the list was contained in the report that Suzuki was obliged 
to submit to Platt Brothers in accordance with the terms of the Toyoda-Platt Agreement).
艓艔 
The contents of Suzuki’s report would startle anyone familiar with production techniques.   
Assembling on a level surface, or in other words, on a surface plate (Item no. 1 on the list), 
was not being carried out, even though it is the most basic principle in the assembly of 
precision machines.  Shafts, which by their nature are supposed to be straight, were not 
straight (Item 2).  Gauges were not being used properly (Items 6, 9, 10, 17).  Not even the 
commonsense foundation of precision operations, measuring the center line, was in place 
(Items 4, 13).    The materials being used in parts were inappropriate (Item 3.)    The list goes 
on.  Suzuki’s report is very concrete, and it gives such a clear impression that the basics of 
production were not being followed that the reader of the report begins to doubt it can be true, 
even for that time in history.  If Shusaku Suzuki had been just an average technician, the 
claim might be made that he had insufficient understanding of how production works.  But 
he was an expert technician whose outstanding abilities were recognized by Platt Brothers’ 
board of directors.    Ought we not rather wonder if the production standards at Platt Brothers 
had fallen rather low?  To answer this question we have to know what occurred at Platt 
Brothers after Kiichiro’s visit there in 1922. 
 
 
iv) A Decline in Platt Brothers Assembly Technology 
In the autumn of 1922, several months after Kiichiro did work training at Platt Brothers, the 
company experienced an important turning point in its history.  Until then almost all of its 
shares were owned by the founder’s family, but the son who was to take over the Platt 
family’s business affairs lost his life during World War I, and for this and other reasons the 
family decided to sell its shares that autumn.    The company thus lost its character as a family 
business and became a public corporation in the true sense of the term.    At that stage (1922) 
the company’s future was considered bright.  But then it met a succession of misfortunes.  
The slump in the Lancashire cotton industry had increasingly depressed the company’s textile 
machinery sales.  As spinning and weaving firms went bankrupt or were forced to integrate 
with other firms, the fine, first-class machines that were the backbone of the Lancashire cotton 
industry flowed into the secondhand machinery market, thus cutting into the market for Platt 
Brothers machines.  From 1928 through 1931 the company did not declare any dividends, 
and in 1931 incurred a loss of £65,000. 
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1932 survey, more than 30% of the workers in Oldham who were eligible for unemployment 
insurance schemes were unemployed.  When you have a high unemployment rate and 
long-term stagnation in corporate performance, it is impossible to give workers sufficient 
pecuniary incentives.    It is not to be wondered at, then, that Kiichiro noticed that morale was 
low in the plant in 1922, where it was the skilled workers who controlled all the operations on 
the factory floor.  And when you have a company like Platt Brothers that is producing 
high-quality products, through very careful fitting of each and every part by skilled workmen, 
a drop in morale on the production site can be a big problem.  The Platt Brothers 
management team at this time (1930), however, was paying attention to other problems.  
They were attempting to exercise effective control over production, prices, and profits through 
large-scale integration of textile machinery manufacturers at a time when the cotton industry 
was tending to shrink.   Leading the merger action was Sir Walter Preston, who took over as 
president in 1930.  After the merger, Platt Brothers’ assets were written down by a massive 
57%, and their capital was reduced from £3,700,000 to £1,600,000.  If, during such 
corporate reconstruction, the nucleus of manufacturing remained under the control of the 
skilled workers, it is quite possible that the quality of the company’s products suffered.  
Furuichi describes an episode that occurred during Preston’s visit to Japan that leads one to 
think that this was in fact the case.      .    On the day before Preston and his associates were to 
sail from Yokohama, Kiichiro and Furuichi were invited to a farewell party aboard their ship.   
The first-class wine flowed freely during the meal, and when participants were beginning the 
dessert course, Preston made a remark to which Furuichi gave a good-intentioned reply. 
 
Preston said, “Now that Platt has actually integrated several companies and quality 
has improved, I’m hoping you’ll sell lots of our goods.”    I replied, “I really would 
like to satisfy your wishes, but... lately the quality of Platt goods has gone down.  
There are many mistakes.  Isn’t this because the good directors in charge of 
technology have gone elsewhere?”  I was a bit drunk at the time, and when I 
thought about it later I realized I had committed a very big gaffe.
艓艕 
 
Furuichi says he meant well and only wanted to take the opportunity to pass on as much 
good advice to the maker as he could, because there were so many troubles with the Platt 
looms being produced then.    But, not surprisingly, what he said was taken badly by Preston, 
and Furuichi had to mend the situation by apologizing.  According to Furuichi, even the 
Mitsui Bussan senior executive who made him apologize consoled him later by saying, with a 
smile on his face, “Everything you said is true.  Japan no longer has to look up to Platt.”
艓艖  
If this episode as recalled by Furuichi is accurate, it bears witness to the fact that it was not 
only the quality of Platt Brothers products that had declined, but the company’s very 
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The problem of Platt Brothers’ production techniques was not just a matter of lower 
morale on the factory floor because of the absence of pecuniary incentives.    Platt, which was 
heavily dependent upon its skilled operators for process management and progress 
management and the like on the production site, was, it is believed, negligent in its efforts to 
adopt new methods of manufacturing, such as the wide-scale introduction of specialized 
machinery.    This negligence is evident in another episode described by Furuichi: 
 
When they heard about a spinning machine finally being produced in Japan, Platt 
sent [John] Bissett, their director in charge of technology, to Japan.    He asked to be 
shown around a parts maker’s factory.  When I took him around to a small shop ... 
the owner ...  took out a number of different gauges from the drawer of a cabinet 
and brought them over, saying, “I make [the parts] so as to fit these.”  I remember 
that Mr. Bissett had this surprised look on his face.  When he got back to his hotel 
he said if he asked a Platt worker how he would make a one-inch rod, he would 
probably get the answer:  “Why, I guess all you have to do is turn it down to 
exactly one inch.”    “It’s ridiculous,” Bissett muttered.
艓艗 
 
Furuichi’s account indicates that the skilled workers on Platt production sites did not 
possess the concept of allowances.
艓艘    To be more precise, all of them had their own ways of 
producing each individual part, and their own allowances, but when they were to make one 
part over and over again, they did not care too much about how to set a certain allowance up 
to such-and-such specifications or how to produce that allowance in a simple and easy way.  
That is why Furuichi could remark that “in those days, even in a place like Platt Brothers, they 
were letting allowances be determined by the worker’s skill,” and that Japanese spinning 





v) Problems on Toyoda Automatic Loom Works’ Side 
The causes of the difficulties met in the production of the Platt-Toyoda loom were not all to 
be found on the Platt Brothers’ side.  The renowned historian of the cotton industry in 
England, Douglas A. Farnie, has pointed out that the blueprints that Toyoda Automatic Loom 
Works supplied to Platt Brothers in accordance with the terms of the Toyoda-Platt Agreement 
had over a hundred errors in them.
艔艐    What he says is probably accurate.    Even though the 
Type G automatic loom had more or less reached the stage where it could be used, one could 
not say that the product was already perfect.  Technicians were constantly making little 
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improved on the basis of the design drawing.    To put it another way, it went on maturing as a 
product and went on increasing in degree of completion.  The problem was that a system to 
notify the relevant department of this sort of daily modification of the blueprints so that the 
changes would be reflected on the actual production site did not seem to exist in the Loom 
Works.  Jiro Iwaoka, former chairman of Aisin Seiki, had the following observations to 
make about the situation in those days. 
 
Of course there was the original drawing of the [Type G] loom.  But there was no 
time to trace over it, blueprint it, and send it to the [production]  site.  Design  change 
after design change--there was no end to design changes.  If you weren’t careful, 
you forgot to note the change on the original drawing.  This was the cause of us 
botching up the drawings at the time we sold the patent [to Platt].   We sent them a 
drawing that was a copy of a tracing of the original drawing.  There was one place 
where we had made a design change partway through, from 1 1/16in to 1 3/16in, but 
it hadn’t been changed on the drawing, and that was what went through to them.  
Well, the loom that we sent them was the new version, but the drawing hadn’t been 
corrected; there was a big stink over this and I was given hell.    There were a lot of 
misses like this.  All because we had been making one change after another, see, 
and there was nobody [who could read drawings] in the place where drawings were 
fixed up after design changes were made, you see, and I was in charge of the site.
艔艑 
 
From this account it is clear that internal organization at Toyoda Automatic Loom Works 
was still at a stage in which there was no systematic procedure for exercising control of design 
changes and technical drawings/blueprints.    Probably the person who was expected to see to 
such internal mechanisms did not have the time to attend to systematizing document 
management and communication flow within the company’s organization. 
Once the Platt-Toyoda loom received such a low appraisal in the performance tests held 
by the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, the Toyoda-Platt Agreement became a worthless piece 
of paper to Platt Brothers.    The result was that a settlement was arrived at by a revision of the 
agreement in 1934, with a substantial reduction in the fee originally agreed upon for the patent 
rights.    When Toyoda Automatic Loom Works exported Type G automatic looms to India in 
1937, Toyoda was forced into a third round of negotiations with Platt Brothers.  Then the 
onset of hostilities between Japan and China created an environment in which the very 
production of spinning and weaving machines could not be carried out freely in Japan. 
There is no denying that attempts by Toyoda Automatic Loom Works to sell Type G 
automatic looms to India and elsewhere were delayed because of the existence of the 
Agreement; in this sense it can be said that Platt Brothers had let the patent lie buried in a 
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no way the company could sell the looms after the pathetic results in Lancashire Cotton 
Corporation’s performance tests.  And Kiichiro did not have any positive reasons for 
explaining all the details of this Toyoda-Platt Agreement.  The press in Japan were 
unanimous in playing up the fact that the global giant, Platt Brothers, had come knocking on 
Toyoda’s door to ask for patent rights to the Toyoda automatic loom.    Needless to say, such 
press coverage represented enormous publicity for Toyoda’s Type G automatic loom.  In 
such an atmosphere, going into all the details of the Toyoda-Platt Agreement fiasco was 
almost an impossibility--the more so if one was one of the parties involved in it.    Moreover, 
the more that was revealed of the whole situation, the surer would be the adverse impact on 
sales of the Type G automatic loom.  It would also be letting competitors know about the 
inadequacies in Toyoda’s internal organization.       
 
 
4. Conclusion: The Influence of Toyoda Platt Agreement over 
the Birth of Japanese Automobile Industry 
The trip Kiichiro began on 12 September 1929 when he left Yokohama ended when, after 
finishing his business in the United States and England, he returned to Japan in April 1930 via 
the Siberian Railway.    The trip had taken approximately seven months. 
Toyoda Automatic Loom Works was a comparatively new manufacturing company, but in 
the process of tackling mass production of a complicated machined-and-assembled product 
like the automatic loom it had made astonishing improvements in its manufacturing capability 
in an extremely short time (especially the capability to produce large quantities of a 
standardized product).  The major reason for this improvement was the fact that it had been 
forced, since the second half of 1927, to produce Type G automatic looms at the rate of 300 a 
month.
艔艒    The company found itself in a situation in which it would be unable to cope with 
demand if it lacked the capability to mass-produce products that required precision machining.   
For this reason, from 1927 on Kiichiro had been focusing on clearing away a variety of 
stumbling blocks in the production area.     
By the end of the 1920s the company was one of only a handful of enterprises in Japan 
that had the manufacturing capability to handle large-quantity production of manufactured 
goods with a high degree of machined precision.    No doubt it was for this very reason that it 
was chosen to be one of the companies to be visited in late October to early November after 
an international industrial convention held in Tokyo.
艔艓    Kiichiro must have been aware that, 
despite being a fairly new company, in the process of producing a complicated fabricated 
product like an automatic loom the company had acquired enough manufacturing capability 
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ahead of other companies in Japan, at least on a par with them. 
There is no denying that having a machine manufacturer like Platt Brothers acknowledge 
the commercial feasibility of the Type G automatic loom and then request a transfer of patent 
rights over the loom was a source of supreme pride and joy for an engineer like Kiichiro.  
Yet at the same time there remained that nagging question: why had Platt Brothers, of all 
companies, been unable to develop an automatic loom on their own?  Could it be that they 
lacked the requisite technical capability?  And why were proposals being brought up 
regarding the establishment of a joint company with Platt Brothers? 
Rumors that Platt Brothers were in serious financial difficulties would have reached 
Kiichiro’s ears even when he was in Japan.  Now, Toyoda Automatic Loom Works was 
gradually looking more and more like Platt Brothers in what it was doing.  Since the 
common apprehension at the time was that Japan was an industrial nation lagging far behind 
the countries of the West, it was only natural for people to imagine what Japan would be in 
the future by looking at the present state of the advanced countries.  It required no special 
flash of genius, then, for Kiichiro to see in the present circumstances of Platt Brothers what 
Toyoda Automatic Loom Works might be like in the future.    And what he saw in December 
1929 and January 1930 was not something to make him optimistic about the future of Toyoda 
Automatic Loom Works; on the contrary, it made him very pessimistic.  Until he had seen 
with his own eyes the situation in Oldham and at Platt Brothers, it was still possible for him to 
think the reports of the stagnation in the cotton industry were exaggerated.  But then came 
the shock of seeing a town that was full of life in January 1922 transformed into a town 
teeming with the unemployed only eight years later, and to see a company that had been 
reaching for the stars eight years ago now struggling to survive.  And it was this dramatic 
change in the short space of eight years that, I am convinced, made Kiichiro finally decide to 
go ahead with the concept that he had secretly been turning over in his mind: to enter into a 
new venture -- the automobile business. Therefore, once back in Japan, Kiichiro swung into 
action.    Veteran employees of the old Toyota Motor Co. have testified that a month after his 
return to the country--in May 1930, therefore—“an automobile research room was set up 
inside the machine shop at Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, and work began on studying the 
automobile.” 
Any consideration of the financial aspect of the establishment of Toyota Motor Co. has to 
take into account the roles played by Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, Toyoda Boshoku, and 
Toyoda Spinning and Weaving Works in Shanghai.  The first of these companies had 
invested up to approximately 17,000,000 yen in the automobile manufacturing business, 
beginning with the “automotive department” within its walls.  The funds that enabled 
Toyoda Automatic Loom Works to invest such a huge sum came from profits it had made in 
the manufacture and sale of Type G automatic looms and ring spinning frames.  Another 
 
26/33 reason, however, was that, when the company increased its capital three times in the space of 
22 months (in January 1934, July 1935, and October 1936), most of its shares were purchased 
by Toyoda Boshoku and the Toyoda company in Shanghai.  As a result, as of March 1937 
the top two owners of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works were Toyoda Boshoku (52.4%) and 
Toyoda Spinning and Weaving Works in Shanghai (33.3%), giving them a combined 
ownership of more than 85% of the shares.  Thus it is clear that Toyota Motor Co. was first 
able to see the light of day because cotton-industry-related companies built up by Sakichi, 
Risaburo, and Kiichiro joined forces and gave the company strong financial backing.  Even 
though the people heading the various Toyoda companies felt uneasy and hesitant when 
preparations were first being made for entry into the automobile business, once they became 
optimistic concerning the feasibility and viability of the business, they poured the required 
money into the new business without any hesitation.    Thus it happened that the various firms 
in the Toyota group of companies would take on the role of providing venture capital and 
giving financial backing to Kiichiro’s bold creation of a new business. 
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